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This paper tests the growth model of distance to the technological frontier, which states that
the closer an economy is to the frontier, the higher the relative importance of innovation relative to
imitation as a source of productivity growth. Hence, an economy closer to the technological frontier
should invest more in skilled labor since innovation is a skill-intensive activity. I use the proportion of
female legislators as an instrument for skilled labor, in contrast to Vandenbussche, Aghion, and Meghir
(2006) who used lagged educational expenditures. The results with the new instrument are consistent
with the theoretical prediction and the previous results of Vandenbussche, Aghion, and Meghir (2006).
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1 Introduction
Does education cause growth? One line of macro growth models treats the stock of human capital as
a factor in improving technology, which in turn plays a role in the production function and contributes
to growth. The assumption is that certain kinds of education equip a person to perform certain jobs or
functions, or enable a person to perform a given function more e⁄ectively. Based on this assumption, Nelson
and Phelps (1966) suggest that educated people make good innovators, so education speeds the forces of
technological di⁄usion. Furthermore, if it is true that innovation produces externalities by showing the
way to imitators, then this implies that education also yields externalities by its stimulation of innovation.
This provides a way to view the e⁄ect of education on growth.
However, it is not e⁄ective for countries with di⁄erent technological levels to take the same strategy
for improving productivity. Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006) claim that the closer an economy is to
the world technological frontier, the higher the relative importance of innovation (relative to imitation) as
a source of productivity growth because there is less room to copy and adopt well-established technologies.
Their statement is based on the assumption that innovation is a relatively more skill-intensive activity
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1than imitation. In other words, skilled labor has a higher growth-enhancing e⁄ect for countries closer to
the technological frontier, and vice versa.
Vandenbussche, Aghion, and Meghir (henceforth VAM) (2006) examine the contribution of human
capital to growth by combining distance to the frontier and human capital. They use a 5-year-interval
dataset covering 19 OECD countries between 1960 and 2000, and deal with problems of endogeneity by
using lagged public expenditures on education as an instrument for levels of human capital. Though the
results are signi￿cant, their instrument may not be credible since it seems likely that expenditures on higher
education 10 years ago may in￿ uence current growth rate through channels other than human capital. For
example, increasing government expenditures on tertiary education may signify a government￿ s aim to
develop those industries with high R&D investment and thereafter raise private enterprises￿incentives to
make related domestic investments. Consequently, increasing domestic demand 10 years ago may impact
current economic growth. Moreover, a high growth country will end up being rich, close to the technological
frontier, and may spend more on tertiary education as a luxury good. In other words, countries with higher
productivity growth may have both higher investment in tertiary education and continuous higher growth
in productivity.
Aghion, Boustan, Hoxby, and Vandenbussche (2006) use U.S. data to ￿nd an exogenous source of
variation in spending on education. This allows them to use a set of political factors as instruments for
educational spending, where the instruments consist of the detailed composition of political committees.
For example, their instruments for investments in research-university education are indicators for a state￿ s
number of legislators on federal appropriations committees, while the instruments for spending in primary
and secondary school are the percentage of judges on the state￿ s supreme court who are progressives and
an indicator for whether the chief justice is a progressive. They ￿nd that Massachusetts, a close-to-frontier
state in the late 1970s, did experience increased growth that coincided with its representative on the House
Appropriations Committee generating an infusion of federal funding.
Building on the idea that political factors may in￿ uence educational investments, this paper re-examines
the theoretical prediction of the growth model in VAM (2006) by using a new instrument. It has been
suggested that education is one of the issues about which female politicians are concerned. There is also
evidence of a positive e⁄ect of women￿ s participation in politics on public educational expenditures from
Chen (2008). It seems reasonable to expect that women support educational policies related to people￿ s
basic needs, such as increasing the schooling accessibility and literacy rate, at lower stages of economic
development, 1 while it is more likely that women turn to support policies about improving quality of
education after the infrastructure of compulsory education is well-established. Increasing the accessibility
of higher education may be one of their secondary goals. This is not only to promote the development of
knowledge, but also to address long-standing inequalities. 2 I, therefore, use the proportion of female
1See also Clots-Figueras (2007).
2Schwindt-Bayer (2007) points out that countries need to ensure that women are in the candidate pool by
encouraging women to continue their education beyond secondary school. They should also be encouraged to
pursue degrees in professional ￿elds that can be springboards to a political career, such as a law degree. Another
2legislators as an instrument for human capital.
In this paper, the analysis exploits the fact that women￿ s political involvement may a⁄ect the fraction
of people with higher education, primarily through their in￿ uence on budget process during their period
in o¢ ce. Thereafter, women￿ s political involvement tends to have e⁄ects on 10-year growth, but may not,
itself, be driven by future growth. It is not necessary, however, that countries with higher productivity
growth have more female legislators. The proportion of female legislators seems to be a good instrument
for assessing human capital. Nevertheless, there is trade-o⁄ between relevance and exogeneity for an
instrument. While the share of female legislators provides an exogenous source for skilled labor, it may be
less relevant in explaining the fraction of people with higher education.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical framework of distance to the
frontier in VAM (2006) and a discussion of the empirical model. Section 3 describes the motivation of
using women in politics as a new instrument and investigates its correlation with education. Section 4
presents the results of the empirical analysis, where I replicate the results of VAM (2006) and compare
those results with results obtained using female legislators as a new instrument. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical and empirical framework
In this section, I ￿rst introduce the theoretical model of distance to the technological frontier in VAM
(2006), and then present my empirical strategy.
Technological frontier models assume ability-biased technological change, and are natural frameworks
by which to think about the importance of skill selection, especially as an economy comes closer to fron-
tier. The technological improvement results from a combination of imitation and innovation. The former
activities are aimed at adopting world frontier technology, while the latter activities are aimed at pushing
forward the technological frontier. Both activities have unskilled and skilled labor as inputs. Following
VAM (2006), technological progress is a linear function of imitation and innovation








where Ai;t is the productivity in sector i at time t, At￿1 is the world productivity frontier at time t ￿ 1,
At￿1 is the country￿ s productivity frontier at the end of period t ￿ 1, um;i;t (sm;i;t) is the amount of
unskilled (skilled) labor input used in imitation in sector i at time t and un;i;t (sn;i;t) is the amount of
unskilled (skilled) labor input used in innovation in sector i at time t. The parameter ￿ (￿) is the elasticity
of unskilled labor in imitation (innovation). ￿ > 0 measures the relative e¢ ciency of innovation compared
to imitation in generating productivity growth, and ￿ > 0 measures the e¢ ciency of the overall process of
technological improvement. Here it is assumed that ￿ < ￿, in order to re￿ ect the higher intensity of skilled
labor in innovation than in imitation. Equation (1) says that the productivity in sector i today is based
option for advancing the status of women is to get more women into the paid labor force and provide leadership
training such that they can hold managerial positions.
3on its productivity yesterday adjusted by the technological progress, where the progress results from both
innovation and imitation activities. 3










where ￿ 2 (0;1), xi;t is the ￿ ow of intermediate good i produced monopolistically and lt is the amount of
land used in ￿nal production at time t. VAM (2006) normalize the total supply of land to one. The local
intermediate producer decides the output of xi;t by maximizing individual pro￿ts and this determines the
demand for di⁄erent types of labor at period t by maximizing the net post-innovation pro￿t. Under the












sn;t , which refers to the reallocation e⁄ect, (i.e., innovation
employs skilled labor more intensively) while imitation employs unskilled labor more intensively.
In an economy endowed with an exogenous stock of U units of unskilled labor and S units of skilled
labor, the growth rate of productivity is given by
gA = ￿￿fUh(a)1￿￿￿ + Sh(a)￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)g
where h(a) is a decreasing function of the proximity to the frontier, a ￿ At
At. The e⁄ect of S on growth is
increasing in a, while the e⁄ect of U on growth is decreasing in a. This indicates the composition e⁄ect.
That is, if a country is closer to the frontier, it should invest more in skilled labor in order to enhance the
economy. On the other hand, the innovation sector will expand since skilled labor tends to go to innovation
relative to imitation, according to reallocation e⁄ect.
To summarize, the growth-enhancing e⁄ect of a marginal increase in the stock of skilled human capital
is stronger the closer the economy is to the technological frontier. This the main theoretical prediction by
VAM (2006) and is going to be re-examined in the following empirical analysis.
For the empirical model, I ￿rst assume that the stock of skilled human capital is the skilled fraction
of the labor force. Following the methods of VAM (2006), the measure of skilled human capital stock is
the fraction of people with more than a secondary school education. I estimate the following equation for
labor productivity growth
gj;t = ￿1;j + ￿2aj;t￿1 + ￿3fj;t￿1 + ￿4aj;t￿1 ￿ fj;t￿1 + "j;t (2)
where gj;t = logAj;t ￿ logAj;t￿1 is the labor productivity growth in country j at period t, aj;t￿1 =
logAj;t￿1 ￿ logAt￿1 is the log of productivity in country j relative to the productivity frontier in the
previous period and fj;t￿1 is the fraction of the population with higher education in the previous period.
3See Appendix for details on the derivation of the model.
4￿1;j re￿ ects country dummies. If the prediction from the model is correct, we will see a positive sign for
￿3 for countries closer to the frontier, and a positive sign for ￿4 as well. That is, given countries with
similar distance to the frontier, those countries with more skilled labor will exhibit a higher growth rate.
Since there is a concern about the endogeneity of variables on the right hand side of equation (2),
VAM (2006) estimate the distance to the frontier, aj;t￿1, by its lagged value, aj;t￿2. On the other hand,
they use expenditures on tertiary education per capita lagged for two periods as an instrument for the
fraction of the population with higher education, fj;t￿1. However, their instrument for human capital may
not be credible for two reasons. First, it seems likely that expenditures on higher education 10 years ago
in￿ uences current growth rate through channels other than human capital. Second, some countries with
higher productivity growth may have both higher investment in tertiary education and continuous higher
growth in productivity. Hence, I use the proportion of female legislators in parliament as an instrument
for human capital. The next section discusses this new instrument.
3 New instrument for human capital: Women in politics
During the 1960s-1980s, the second wave of the feminist movement, political parties across Western Europe
came under pressure to adopt policies attractive to female voters and to provide greater opportunities for
women￿ s participation in the formal political arena. This was the case even in those countries in which a
well-organized women￿ s movement was not developed. Women￿ s perception of their role as representatives
seems to di⁄er from their male counterparts in some important ways.
Although women are just as likely as men to see themselves as delegates or trustees, women, in com-
parison to men, are more likely to see themselves as representatives of their gender. 4 They might be
more inclined, therefore, to give priority to legislation about women, and they take pride in legislative
accomplishments in traditional areas of concern to women. 5 Data collected by the Inter-Parliamentary
Union (IPU) in 1992 highlight the fact that it is in the areas of family, social a⁄airs, health, and education
that women are most numerous in the parliamentary committee among countries in Western Europe, and
these areas are those that are related to women￿ s traditional role in the family. Though party discipline
may restrict female legislators￿work on women￿ s issues, it appears that they are usually working across
party lines to the extent permissible by party discipline. As women achieve a more sizeable presence, their
policy impact may be even greater. Male legislators who work with a sizeable number of female legislators
are more likely to sponsor legislation concerning the social, legal, and economic position of women than are
male legislators in arenas in which women do not have a signi￿cant numeric presence. 6 The dynamics of
4Thomas (1994) points out that in the United States, female delegates have been found to value aspects of their
jobs related to civic duty, while men have been more inclined to pay more attention to legislative e⁄ectiveness or
status within the legislative chamber.
5This conclusion comes from a survey of both legislative houses in the U.S. by Thomas (1994). Davis (1997)
studies the case among Western European countries and W￿ngnerud (2005) uses parliamentary survey studies
conducted in the Swedish Parliament. Both groups obtained similar results.
6See Thomas (1994).
5electoral competition may provide one interpretation. If male politicians do not sponsor more legislation
concerning women, female politicians might take over the male legislators￿vote shares from voters who
care about women￿ s needs.
Empirical studies, such as Lott and Kenny (1999) and Edlund and Pande (2002), discuss women￿ s
preferences about public policies. 7 There are also empirical studies analyzing female politicians￿in￿ uence
on policy outcomes, such as Besley and Case (2000), Pande (2003), Chattopadhyay and Du￿ o (2004),
Clots-Figureas (2007), and Svaleryd (2007). 8 Overall, there is evidence that female politicians have
systematically di⁄erent preferences on public policies than male politicians, which is likely to a⁄ect the
decision-making patterns and policy outcomes.
Chen (2008) provides evidence that in developed countries the greater the representation of women
in parliament, the higher the educational expenditures, both as share of GDP and in per capita terms.
9 It seems reasonable to expect that women care about both the quantity and quality of children￿ s
education. Women support educational policies related to people￿ s basic needs, such as increasing the
schooling accessibility and literacy rates, at lower stages of economic development, while it is more likely
that women turn to support policies regarding improving education quality after the infrastructure of
compulsory education is well-established. Increasing the accessibility of higher education may be one of
the initiative supported by female legislators. This support is not only aimed at increasing knowledge
development, but also at addressing long-standing inequalities. In a developed country, the attention may
focus on issues related to higher education more than on policies about primary and secondary education,
and the representation of female legislators may play a role in determining this focus. In other words,
women may tend to in￿ uence policies about higher education, which thereafter may impact the levels of
human capital.
According to Edlund and Pande (2002), the rise of non-marriage in recent decades in Western society
may result in di⁄erent policy preferences between women and men since men were previously thought
to transfer resources to women in marriage. Therefore, women may be encouraged to be self-supporting
and enter the labor market with the increasing divorce rate, which, in turn, may raise their demand for
gender equality in their career. Hence, women may favor those policies related to the improvement of
7Lott and Kenny (1999) show that women switched to preferring a big government after su⁄rage was granted
to women; Edlund and Pande (2002) ￿nd that women are more likely to support Democratic party as divorce rate
is getting higher.
8Besley and Case (2000) believe that women￿ s traditional role in the family should make female legislators,
relative to male legislators, care more about workers￿compensation. The results strongly support that the fraction
of women in upper and lower house is a highly signi￿cant determinant of the workers￿compensation policy, which,
in turn, reduces the unemployment rate and raise the average hourly earning of workers in construction sector.
Pande (2003) ￿nds that political reservation has increased transfers to groups which bene￿t from the mandate.
Chattopadhyay and Du￿ o (2004) observe that Village Councils in India with woman as the leadership invest more
in infrastructure, such as drinking water and roads, which are more closely linked to women￿ s concerns. Clots-
Figureas (2007) uses quasi-experimental election outcomes to estimate the causal e⁄ect of the gender of politicians,
and ￿nds that primary education attainment is higher in urban areas of India where female political representation
is higher. Svaleryd (2007) studies whether the degree of women￿ s representation in Swedish local councils a⁄ects
local public expenditure patterns.
9There is also evidence from other empirical studies showing that women support educational spending once
they are able to participate in politics. For examples, see Lott and Kenny (1999) and Svaleryd (2007).
6women￿ s social status, such as increasing women￿ s opportunity to pursue higher education, once more
women are able to participate in the decision-making process. Even in the case where expenditures on
higher education are earmarked for women, those expenditures may create a gender-neutral climate for
attending education beyond secondary school. In other words, in addition to women, men are likely to be
in￿ uenced and pursue tertiary education as well.
Figure 1 presents the fraction of female legislators and the ratio of public expenditures on higher
education to GDP in 19 OECD countries from 1960 to 2005. 10 The data is in 5-year intervals. The
fraction of female legislators comes from Women in Parliaments: 1945-1995. World Statistical Survey
issued by the IPU. 11 I only consider women￿ s representation in the lower chamber. 12 It shows a
positive correlation between the share of female legislators and educational investments for most of the
countries.
I further pool all observations across countries and, in Figure 2, provide a simple graphical illustration
of the relationship between the fraction of female legislators and expenditures on tertiary education per
capita. While some caution is needed in interpreting this graph as nothing else is being controlled for, the
￿gure shows that expenditures on tertiary education per capita is signi￿cantly and positively correlated
with the fraction of female legislators.
VAM (2006) show that lagged expenditures on tertiary education is signi￿cantly and positively corre-
lated to the fraction of people with higher education. 13 Accordingly, I expect that female legislators
have an in￿ uence on the proportion of people with higher education through the budget process. There
may be worry about endogeneity problems concerning women in politics. That is, countries with policies
that are less discriminatory against women are be expected to have both a higher proportion of women
in politics and more women with a higher education degree, which consequently raises the proportion of
people with higher education. If this is the case, it is doubtful that higher levels of women in politics is the
factor leading to an expansion of expenditures on education and an increase in the proportion of people
with higher education. I, therefore, investigate whether there is correlation between the share of female
legislators and the incidence of higher education in the combined male and the female population. The
results are reported in Table 1, which shows that the proportion of female legislators is strongly correlated
to both the incidence of higher education in the total population and also in the female population. In-
creasing female legislators by one percentage point increases the incidence of higher education in the total
population and in the female population by 0.221 and 0.284 percentage points, respectively. Although
the statistical power is not as high as that in the correlation between the proportion of female legislators
10These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, which are the same as those examined by VAM (2006).
11The series after 1995 is collected from the website of IPU.
12The results using the average fraction of female parliamentarians in the upper and lower houses are similar
to the results using only the fraction of female parliamentarians in the lower house. Moreover, representation in
the lower house is used in cross-national studies of this type because in bicameral systems lower house legislators
generally have more legislative power than those in the upper house.
13This is reported in Table 2 in VAM (2006).
7and the incidence of higher education in the total population and in the female population, there is a
relevant correlation between the share of female legislators and the incidence of higher education in the
male population. In other words, the greater share of women in politics not only re￿ ects the increasing
numbers of women with higher education degrees, but also bene￿ts the educational status of the male
population, both through female in￿ uence on budget allocation.
In short, the proportion of female legislators is positively correlated with the budget allocation to higher
education during their period in o¢ ce. Since the economic growth rate today is less likely to a⁄ect the
representation of women in politics 10 years ago and it is not necessarily true that countries with higher
productivity growth have more female legislators, the proportion of female legislators seems to be a good
instrument for human capital. 14
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Data description
The dataset used here includes 19 OECD countries examined between 1960 and 2000, the same as is
included by VAM (2006). These countries are well-developed countries and are supposedly specialize in
innovation relative to imitation. 15 I use total factor productivity, obtained from VAM (2006), as a proxy
for labor productivity growth. 16 Education data is taken from Barro and Lee (2001), who provide the
distribution of the population across schooling attainment levels at 5-year intervals.
Since the period of observation, constrained by the availability of education data from Barro and Lee
(2001), is every ￿ve years, there is quite a lot of persistence allowed. The right side variables are therefore
treated as endogenous. The instrument for aj;t￿1 is the log of the proximity to the frontier lagged two
periods (aj;t￿2), the same as VAM (2006). However, I take the proportion of female legislators lagged
two periods as an instrument for fj;t￿1, while VAM (2006) use expenditures on tertiary education per
capita lagged two periods as an instrument. Figure 3.3 presents the proportion of female legislators and
the proportion of people with a higher education degree in each country from 1960 to 2000. Both the
proportion of people with a higher education degree and the proportion of female legislators grow over
time. Finally, the instrument for aj;t￿1 ￿ fj;t￿1 is the interaction of the two instruments. Descriptive
statistics are provided in Table 2.
14For example, the U.S. is always at the technological frontier in this study, but the level of female legislators
is relatively low across these 19 OECD countries. The regression results of the proportion of female legislators as
the dependent variable and the productivity growth as the independent variable show that there is no correlation
between these two variables. I include country and year dummies in the regression, and cluster at the country level.
15Note 13 in VAM (2006) state that ￿... our theoretical mechanism is less likely to be at play in low-income
countries, which are specialized in imitation.￿
16In VAM (2006), total factor productivity is de￿ned as output per adult minus capital per adult times the capital
share, where capital stock is constructed by a classic perpetual inventory method assuming a depreciation rate of
6%. The results are not qualitatively a⁄ected using GDP per adult instead.
84.2 Replication of VAM (2006)
A replication of Table 3 from VAM (2006) is presented in Panel A of Table 3, which is also an estimation
of equation (2) with the lagged educational expenditures as an instrument for assessing human capital.
Columns (1) and (2) are the regressions without the interaction term. In column (1), country dummies are
excluded, and there is a signi￿cant e⁄ect of proximity to the frontier on growth. In column (2), country
dummies are controlled, and the result shows that human capital has a positive in￿ uence on growth. When
the interaction term is included and country dummies are excluded, which is shown in column (3), there is
a signi￿cant e⁄ect of human capital on growth given the distance to the frontier. However, this interaction
e⁄ect disappears when country dummies are included. Therefore, VAM (2006) control for group dummies
in column (5) instead. In general, the replication results are quite close to the ones in VAM (2006), which
are copied in Panel B of Table 3. 17 In column (5), the interaction term shows that adults with tertiary
education are more important for growth in economies closer to the frontier.
4.3 Results with women in politics as an instrument
Even though the instrument for the fraction of people with higher education in VAM (2006) seems to be
relevant enough, it may not be credible. I therefore estimate the model by their speci￿cation but use the
new instrument, the proportion of female legislators lagged two periods. Table 4 presents the reduced
form for the models, i.e., the ￿rst stage in Two Stage Least Squares. All the regressions include country
dummies and year dummies. The independent variables of interest are the log of the proximity to the
frontier lagged two periods (i.e., 10 years before), the proportion of female legislators lagged two periods,
and the interaction of these two instruments. The results are reported in Panel A. 18
In column (1), lagged proximity explains proximity signi￿cantly. In the second reduced form for the
proportion of people with higher education, lagged representation of female legislators has a positive
relationship with the fraction of skilled adults when both country and year e⁄ects are included, though
the relationship not signi￿cant. This e⁄ect is relevant, however, if group dummies and group speci￿c
trends are controlled. 19 In the third reduced form for the interaction of proximity with frontier and
education, lagged proximity and lagged proportion of female legislators are positively correlated when they
are interacted with each other. 20
Table 5 provides the results for total factor productivity growth equation, i.e., estimation of equation
(2). All the regressions control for country and year dummies at the ￿rst stage, and control for year
17The slight di⁄erences in estimates from those in VAM (2006) may be a result of di⁄erent data sources of real
GDP per capita, which is used to obtain the educational expenditures.
18Panel B in Table 4 presents the results using VAM￿ s instrument, lagged expenditures on tertiary education, for
skilled labor.
19Since the change of women￿ s representation in politics is based on election year, its e⁄ect on human capital
may disappear when the controls dummies for year are included. Moreover, country dummies may also take away
the variation at the level of female legislators, and reduce the statistical e¢ ciency of the estimate.
20The estimate of the interaction term is signi￿cant when I include all 130 observations. To drop observations for
the purpose of providing comparable estimates with the results by using the instrument adopted in VAM (2006)
may lead to a loss of information.
9dummies at the second stage. Panel A reports the results with female legislators as an instrument for
human capital, while Panel B reports the replication of Table 3 in VAM (2006). Column (1) of Panel A
displays the regression without the interaction term and country dummies. The e⁄ect of lagged distance
on growth is negative, which implies the convergence of labor productivity growth. Since the proximity is
always negative except for the countries that are exactly on the frontier, the smaller the absolute value of
proximity becomes, the closer the country is to the technological frontier. It therefore can be concluded
that for a country far away from the frontier, the growth rate is stronger than for a country closer to the
frontier. This may re￿ ect the di¢ culty of innovation and the relative ease of imitation. Such an e⁄ect is
not mediated by education.
When the interaction e⁄ect between proximity and the proportion of people with higher education
is included and country dummies are excluded, which is the case in column (3), there is a positive and
signi￿cant e⁄ect of education on growth. Skilled labor increases growth more in higher developed countries
as compared to lower developed countries. Furthermore, the interaction e⁄ect is positive and statistically
signi￿cant, which gives the same conclusion as VAM (2006) and is consistent with the prediction of the
theoretical model. However, these e⁄ects vanish when the country dummies are included. This is also the
case in the work by VAM (2006). Hence, those authors introduce group dummies by grouping countries
according to geographical proximity and/or institutional proximity. 21 The results are displayed in
column (5), and are encouraging in this respect. The new instrument for human capital, the proportion of
female legislators, gives support to the theoretical model in addition to the instrument adopted in VAM
(2006).
Even though the reduced form in Table 4 shows that lagged expenditures on tertiary education are
more relevant than lagged representation of female legislators as an instrument for skilled labor, the new
instruments may be more credible than the ones in VAM (2006). The increased credibility is conditional on
the arguments that educational expenditures 10 years ago may in￿ uence current growth by its side e⁄ect
on domestic investment, and countries with higher productivity growth may have both higher investment
in tertiary education and continuous higher growth in productivity. This is less likely to be the case for the
level of female legislators. Moreover, the results at the second stage with di⁄erent instruments for skilled
labor controlling for group dummies, i.e., column (5) in Table 5, are not di⁄erent from each other very
much.
However, there is concern about the relevance of the instrument from the results in the reduced form,
where standard estimators can be severely biased and conventional methods for inference can be misleading.
22 Therefore I correct the size of standard errors using the method proposed by Moreira (2006). 23
21This increases the e¢ ciency of the estimates in VAM (2006).
22It has been argued that weak instruments do not cause a serious problem using the conventional methods such
as Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) and Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) in the just-identi￿ed
case or lower degrees of over-identi￿cation. However, standard estimators can be severely biased and conventional
methods for inference can be misleading when there is a high degree of over-identi￿cation. See Guido Imbens
(2007). The model in this paper belongs to the category of high degree of over-identi￿cation because I always
include country and year dummies at the ￿rst stage, while there are only three endogenous regressors.
23I take the predicted value of the reduced form of proximity to the frontier as an exogenous regressor when
10Table 6 provides the results. In column (5), the estimate of the interaction term supports the theoretical
prediction, i.e., given countries with similar distances to the frontier, those countries with more skilled
labor will have a higher growth rate. 24
To give further comparison of the validity of these two instruments, I instrument human capital by
both the lagged level of female legislators and lagged expenditures on tertiary education. In column (5)
of Table 7, the Hansen J statistic shows that both instruments are valid for assessing human capital, and
the results continue to strongly support the growth model.
5 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to look for a new instrument for assessing human capital in the growth
model. I adopt the proportion of female legislators as the best candidate because there may be signi￿cant
di⁄erences in the legislative priorities between men and women. Their traditional role in the family makes
women likely to give priority to legislation regarding issues about women, children, family, education,
health, and welfare. Many studies have found that one critical factor in women￿ s impact on policy is the
size of their presence within the legislature, since they usually work across party lines, which is seldom
observed with men occupying the same positions. Furthermore, the proportion of female legislators may
in￿ uence the budget allocation to higher education during their period in o¢ ce, which may be re￿ ected in
the increasing proportion of people with higher education degrees 5 years after and may generate an e⁄ect
on economic growth another 5 years later. Since the economic growth rate today is less likely to a⁄ect
the representation of women in politics 10 years ago, and it is not necessary that countries with higher
productivity growth have more female legislators, the proportion of female legislators seems to be a good
instrument for human capital.
I present evidence that the share of female legislators is positively correlated with tertiary educational
expenditures, and VAM (2006) show that lagged educational expenditures is signi￿cantly and positively
correlated to the fraction of people with higher education. I accordingly expect that female legislators have
an in￿ uence on the proportion of people with higher education through the budget process. The estimate
of the growth equation using the speci￿cation in VAM (2006) with the new instrument is consistent with
the theoretical prediction after correcting for the size of standard errors. Moreover, the Hansen J statistic
shows that both lagged educational expenditures and lagged representation of female legislators are valid
instruments for human capital.
Basically, there are pros and cons for both instruments based on relevance and exogeneity. The reduced
form shows that lagged representation of female legislators is less relevant to the fraction of skilled labor,
estimating equation (2) without the interaction term since Table 4 shows that the instrument is relevant. Then
I estimate the growth model using the STATA command ￿condivreg￿ . When estimating equation (2) with the
interaction term, I take the predicted values of the reduced form of proximity to the frontier and the proportion of
people with a higher education degree as exogenous regressors.
24The estimate of Fraction is signi￿cant when I include all 130 observations.
11compared to lagged educational expenditures. However, the former instrument may provide a more credible
source for human capital in the growth model since educational expenditures 10 years ago may in￿ uence
current growth due to its side e⁄ects on domestic investment, and countries with higher productivity growth
may have both a higher investment in tertiary education and continuously higher growth in productivity.
This is less likely the case for the level of female legislators.
In general, this study o⁄ers a view of the e⁄ect of women in politics conditional on the growth model
of distance to the technological frontier. It would be interesting to analyze the general e⁄ect of female
legislators on growth per se. Moreover, female legislators may show their preferences on certain issues in
tertiary education, such as increasing the opportunities for women to enter higher education rather than
raising R&D expenditures, which may in￿ uence the productivity of certain types of labor. Therefore, using
the representation of female legislators as an instrument for certain type of skilled human capital may lead
to another avenue of research on productivity growth.
126 Appendix
Following VAM (2006), technological progress is a linear function of imitation and innovation:








where Ai;t is the productivity in sector i at time t, At￿1 is the world productivity frontier at time t ￿ 1,
At￿1 is the country￿ s productivity frontier at the end of period t ￿ 1, um;i;t (sm;i;t) is the amount of
unskilled (skilled) labor input used in imitation in sector i at time t and un;i;t (sn;i;t) is the amount of
unskilled (skilled) labor input used in innovation in sector i at time t. The parameter ￿ (￿) is the elasticity
of unskilled labor in imitation (innovation). ￿ > 0 measures the relative e¢ ciency of innovation compared
to imitation in generating productivity growth, and ￿ > 0 measures the e¢ ciency of the overall process of
technological improvement. Here it is assumed that ￿ < ￿, in order to re￿ ect the higher intensity of skilled
labor in innovation as compared to imitation. This equation says that the productivity in sector i today
is based on its productivity yesterday, adjusted by technological progress, where the progress results from
both innovation and imitation activities.










where ￿ 2 (0;1), xi;t is the ￿ ow of intermediate good i produced monopolistically and lt is the amount of
land used in ￿nal production at time t. VAM normalize the total supply of land to one. The intermediate







where pi;t is the price of the intermediate good i. The local monopolist chooses xi;t to solve
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and total operation pro￿t
￿F = ￿Ai;t
where ￿ ￿ ( 1
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In an economy endowed with an exogenous stock of U units of unskilled labor and S units of skilled labor,
the conditions for labor-market clearing in intermediate ￿rms are de￿ned as
U ￿ um;t + un;t
S ￿ sm;t + sn;t




￿(t) ￿ [wu;t(um;t + un;t) ￿ ws;t(sm;t + sn;t)]At￿1
where wu;tAt￿1 and ws;tAt￿1 are the wages of unskilled and skilled labor, respectively, and equal to the
marginal productivity of labor in the ￿nal good sector. Assuming an interior solution, the ￿rst-order
conditions of this maximization program can be written as































sn;t , which is referred to as the reallocation e⁄ect (i.e. innovation
employs skilled labor more intensively while imitation employs unskilled labor more intensively).
Moreover, the growth rate of productivity is given by
gA = ￿￿fUh(a)1￿￿￿ + Sh(a)￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)g
where
h(a) ￿ [























In addition, the e⁄ect of S on growth is increasing in a, while the e⁄ect of U on growth is decreasing in a.
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This indicates the composition e⁄ect. That is, if a country is closer to the frontier, it should invest more
in skilled labor in order to enhance the economy. In this paradigm, the innovation sector will expand since
skilled labor drives innovation rather than imitation, according to the reallocation e⁄ect.
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17Table 1: Correlation between the share of female legislators and the fraction of higher education in certain
population
Dependent Variable Total Pop. Male Pop. Female Pop.
(1) (2) (3)
Share of female legislators .221 .151 .284
(.075)*** (.087)* (.084)***
R2 0.98 0.97 0.97
Observations 132 132 132
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three * indicate signi￿cance at the 10, 5 and 1% level
respectively. 2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level. 3. All of the regressions include
group dummies and group trends. 4. The sample period is from 1970 to 2000 at 5-year intervals.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Means S.D. Min Max
Proximity
TFP -0.31 0.15 -0.68 0
Education
% of people with higher education 13.40 10.72 1 54.30
Instrument of education
% of female legislators in lower house 13.46 11.58 0 45.27
Table 3: Replication of VAM (2006)
Panel A: replication of Table 3 in VAM (2006)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Proximity -.077 -.230 -.158 -.251 -.329
(.045)* (.144) (.041)*** (.139)* (.049)***
Fraction -.036 .381 .125 .481 .340
(.079) (.437) (.048)*** (.388) (.113)***
Prox*frac - - .755 .599 1.314
(.193)*** (.877) (.303)***
Country dummies No Yes No Yes Groups
Weak IV F statistics 23.277 4.979 18.373 3.084 6.431
(Critical value) (4.39) - (4.28) - (4.37)
Observations 122 122 122 122 122
Panel B: copy of Table 3 in VAM (2006)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Proximity -.079 -.230 -.157 -.240 -.320
(.050) (.170) (.044)*** (.170) (.055)***
Fraction -.032 .410 .123 .470 .331
(.084) (.490) (.051)** (.440) (.120)**
Prox*frac - - .740 .420 1.270
(.210)*** (.960) (.340)***
Country dummies No Yes No Yes Groups
Observations 122 122 122 122 122
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three * indicate signi￿cance at the 10, 5 and 1% level
respectively. 2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level. 3. Weak IV F statistics denotes
Cragg-Donald F test, which is used for weak identi￿cation test. Critical value is Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical
value at 30% maximal IV relative bias. 4. All of the regressions at the ￿rst stage include country and year dummies.
18Figure 1: Female legislators and expenditures on tertiary education
Note: 1. x-axis is year, and y-axis is percentage. 2. In order to study the pattern these two variables, I scale up
the ratio of higher educational expenditures to GDP by 10 times. 3. Country isocodes are ￿AUS￿for Australia,
￿AUT￿for Austria, ￿BEL￿for Belgium, ￿CAN￿for Canada, ￿DNK￿for Denmark, ￿FIN￿for Finland, ￿FRA￿for
France, ￿GRC￿for Greece, ￿IRL￿for Ireland, ￿ITA￿for Italy, ￿NLD￿for Netherlands, ￿NZL￿for New Zealand,
￿NOR￿for Norway, ￿PRT￿for Portugal, ￿ESP￿for Spain, ￿SWE￿for Sweden, ￿CHE￿for Switzerland, ￿GBR￿
for United Kingdom, and ￿USA￿for United States.
19Figure 2: Correlation between female legislators and expenditures on tertiary education per capita
Note: x-axis is percentage.
20Figure 3: Female legislators and people with higher education
Note: x-axis is year, and y-axis is percentage.
21Table 4: Reduced form
Panel A: female legislators as an instrument for skilled labor
Proximity Fraction Prox*Frac
(1) (2) (3)
Lagged proximity .670 -.126 .033
(.091)*** (.118) (.031)
Lagged fem -.529 .320 .015
(.285)* (.277) (.071)
Lagged prox*fem -2.152 1.446 .134
(1.084)* (.991) (.251)
R2 0.99 0.98 0.95
Observations 120 120 120
Panel B: educational expenditures as an instrument for skilled labor
Proximity Fraction Prox*Frac
(1) (2) (3)
Lagged proximity .594 -.054 .006
(.111)*** (.088) (.030)
Lagged exp -.000 .000 .000
(.000)*** (.000)** (.000)
Lagged prox*exp -.001 .001 .000
(.000)** (.000) (.000)***
R2 0.99 0.98 0.95
Observations 120 120 120
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three * indicate signi￿cance at the 10, 5 and 1% level
respectively. 2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level. 3. The results in Panel B is
comparable with Table 2 in VAM (2006) if tertiary expenditures are in thousand dollars.
Table 5: Total factor productivity growth equation
Panel A: the results with the new instrument
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Proximity -.057 -.213 -.136 .016 -.334
(.042) (.457) (.036)*** (2.062) (.054)***
Fraction -.063 .382 .090 1.185 .409
(.071) (2.414) (.042)** (5.837) (.163)**
Prox*frac - - .676 -1.959 1.482
(.168)*** (22.907) (.357)***
Country dummies No Yes No Yes Groups
Weak IV F statistic 18.883 0.200 12.090 0.016 3.441
(Critical value) (4.39) - (4.28) - (4.37)
Observations 120 120 120 120 120
Panel B: replication of Table 3 in VAM (2006)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Proximity -.065 -.197 -.144 -.211 -.313
(.042) (.183) (.036)*** (.187) (.047)***
Fraction -.049 .500 .106 .567 .345
(.073) (.551) (.040)*** (.488) (.111)***
Prox*frac - - .712 .398 1.285
(.183)*** (.969) (.305)***
Country dummies No Yes No Yes Groups
Weak IV F statistic 22.237 3.319 18.113 2.168 6.670
(Critical value) (4.39) - (4.28) - (4.37)
Observations 120 120 120 120 120
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three * indicate signi￿cance at the 10, 5 and 1% level
respectively. 2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the country level. 3. Weak IV F statistics denotes
Cragg-Donald F test, which is used for weak identi￿cation test. Critical value is Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical
value at 30% maximal IV relative bias. 4. All of the regressions at the ￿rst stage include country and year dummies.
22Table 6: Total factor productivity growth equation with correct size of s.e.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Proximity -.057 -.213 -.136 .016 -.334
(.042) (.416) (.057)** (1.430) (.099)***
Fraction -.063 .382 .090 1.185 .409
(.072) (2.711) (.104) (3.761) (.295)
Prox*frac - - .676 -1.959 1.482
(.365)* (14.943) (.669)**
Country dummies No Yes No Yes Groups
p-value 0.336y 0.888y 0.016z 0.900z 0.018z
Observations 120 120 120 120 120
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three * indicate signi￿cance at the 10, 5 and 1% level
respectively. 2. All of the regressions at the ￿rst stage include country and year dummies. 3. y refers to conditional
p-value for the estimate of Fraction estimated by LIML. z refers to conditional p-value for the estimate of Prox*frac
estimated by LIML.
Table 7: Comparison of instruments for human capital
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Proximity -.065 -.198 -.146 -.213 -.315
(.042) (.205) (.041)*** (.216) (.057)***
Fraction -.047 .490 .110 .565 .353
(.071) (.543) (.062)* (.534) (.160)**
Prox*frac - - .718 .384 1.295
(.335)** (.941) (.386)***
Country dummies No Yes No Yes Groups
Hansan J statistic 17.479 0.002 18.205 0.036 4.034
Chi-sq p-value 0.558 0.965 0.574 0.982 0.995
Observations 120 120 120 120 120
Note: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. One, two and three * indicate signi￿cance at the 10, 5 and 1% level
respectively. 2. Standard errors are robust. 3. The Hansen J test is a test of overidentifying restrictions. The joint
null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments. 4. All of the regressions at the ￿rst stage include
country and year dummies.
23